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SECURING LAND TENURE &
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
GUINEA SAVANNAH: A GHANAIAN CASE
STUDY
Michael S. Talbot*
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, a comprehensive study commissioned by the World
Bank dubbed the Guinea Savannah “Africa’s Sleeping Giant.”1
Covering some 600 million hectares, the Guinea Savannah ranges
from Guinea Conakry on the west coast of Africa, east to South
Sudan, as far south as Mozambique, and includes an estimated 400
million hectares of arable land in nearly two-dozen countries. Yet
the World Bank reports that less than 10% of this area is being
successfully used for agricultural production.2 Simply put (and as
will be explicated throughout this paper), the Guinea Savannah
represents a substantial opportunity in the effort towards food
security and poverty reduction – two of the foundational components
of human rights promotion.
There are, of course, myriad reasons why the agricultural
potential of the Guinea Savannah has gone largely unexploited;
cultural, political, commercial, financial, and numerous other factors
are at play. Nor is the Guinea Savannah a homogenous region, and
the influence of individual factors inevitably varies as one travels the
nearly 14,000 kilometers from Guinea Conakry to Mozambique.
Throughout the continent there is substantial variation in both
topography and culture. Yet, a central component of any effort to
*

South Carolina School of Law, Class of 2013. The author appreciates
the assistance of Professor Josh Eagle, Whitney Smith, and all the members
of SCJILB for their support and assistance in the preparation of this note.
1
MICHAEL MORRIS ET AL., AGRIC. AND RURAL DEV. UNIT, THE WORLD
BANK, AWAKENING AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT: PROSPECTS FOR COMMERCIAL
AGRICULTURE IN THE GUINEA SAVANNAH ZONE AND BEYOND (2009)
[hereinafter MORRIS ET AL., AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT]; See also Michael
Morris, et al., A Breadbasket for Africa: Farming in The Guinea Savannah
Zone, SOLUTIONS, Apr. 2012, at 44 (providing a concise overview of the
World Bank’s findings).
2
MORRIS ET AL., AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT, supra note 1, ¶ 3.
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promote agricultural development within the Guinea Savannah will
necessarily entail a consideration of land tenure.
The central role of land tenure in agricultural development has
been recognized by the World Bank3 and serves as a major
presumption of this note. Strong agricultural development is
expected to promote food security and poverty reduction therefore
enabling human rights promotion. This note demonstrates the
significance of land tenure, but this is not intended to minimize the
influence of other factors. Similarly, a case study of Ghana provided
in the second half of this note should not be understood as indicative
of the circumstances throughout the entire Guinea Savannah, but
simply as an example of the difficulties involved in developing land
tenure policy and law.
This note aims to examine the implications of various
approaches to land tenure and their potential impacts on food security
and poverty reduction. No single approach will be promoted because
no single approach is without its shortcomings, and in a region as
diverse as the Guinea Savannah there simply is no one-size-fits-all
solution. The note is structured in order to provide a context that will
establish the significance of the discussion, then examine some of the
theories underlying the various approaches, and finally take a look at
the application of these theories in the developing world.
Section I draws heavily from the World Bank’s 2009
Competitive Commercial Agriculture for Africa (CCAA) study to
demonstrate why the Guinea Savannah is ripe for agricultural
development. The potential of internationally-traded commodity
crops suited to the region (and already cultivated in parts of it)
combined with access to regional markets could serve as a
springboard to greater agricultural and economic development in the
future.4 After establishing themselves on what Jeffrey Sachs would
call ‘the first rung of economic development,’5 the people of the
3

See id. ¶ 280.
Id. ¶¶ 60, 88, 90.
5
JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES
FOR OUR TIME 73 (2005). Although many find fault with Sachs connecting
development directly to the establishment of liberal free markets, this
connection is widely accepted by the Bretton Woods institutions and is
frequently a pre-condition for loan eligibility. See generally Nancy
Holmstrom & Richard Smith, The Necessity of Gangster Capitalism:
Primitive Accumulation in Russia and China, 51 Monthly Rev., Issue 9
4

2012]

SECURING LAND TENURE & AGRICULTURAL
133
DEVELOPMENT IN THE GUINEA SAVANNAH: A
GHANAIAN CASE STUDY
Guinea Savannah might be able to build the momentum to move
beyond the insecurity of subsistence farming.
In section II, the immediacy of the need for attention to land
tenure is demonstrated through a discussion of the current land grab
occurring throughout Africa. As commercial interests attempt to
capitalize on the Guinea Savannah’s potential for food production,
timber, biofuels, and carbon offsetting, it becomes crucial for
countries to examine their approach to land tenure.6 As the potential
for profits increases, commercial interests become more and more
willing to tolerate the instability that accompanies uncertainty of
tenure.7 These land developers would prefer strong property rights,
but it is not commercially viable for them to hesitate and risk losing
out while others capitalize. Furthermore, the recognition of property
rights enables long-term users to make rational decisions about use
and alienation, encouraging stability. And a land grab that leapfrogs
land tenure reform will only exacerbate problems.
Section III begins the theoretical component of this note, and
examines the two primary approaches to land tenure. First, there is a
consideration of the individual titling approach promoted most
notably by Hernando de Soto.8 Second, there is an examination of a
more communitarian approach akin to the customary practices
indigenous to many parts of the Guinea Savannah. Finally, there is a
discussion of the potential for the hybridization of the two
approaches. In this section, emphasis is placed on the potential each
approach provides for agricultural and economic development, the
(Feb.) 2000 (providing examples of criticisms against Sachs) available at
http://monthlyreview.org/2000/02/01/the-necessity-of-gangster-capitalism;
Warren Nyamugasira and Rick Rowden, New Strategies, Old Loan
Conditions: The Case of Uganda (2002), http://www.brettonwood
sproject.org/topic/adjustment/ugandaanalysis.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2012)
(critiquing specific conditions for obtaining loans in Uganda).
6
See LORENZO COTULA ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ET. AL., LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT
OPPORTUNITY? AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAND
DEALS IN AFRICA 52–59 (2009), available at http://pubs.iied.org/p
dfs/12561IIED.pdf?.
7
As rates of returns increase, the need for long-term certainty
decreases.
8
See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000)
(arguing that individual land tenure and other neo-liberal policies form the
foundation of economic development).
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appropriateness to the region, and any additional concerns, including
the protection of vulnerable populations.
Section IV begins the shift from the theoretical to the applied, as
consideration is given to the question of scale. The CCAA
specifically addressed the question of whether the Guinea Savannah
will benefit more from a large-scale fee system similar to that
established in the Cerrado region of Brazil or a smaller fee approach
like that of Northeast Thailand.9 Both regions exemplify the
potential impact of successful land tenure reform but they also
reiterate the importance of tailoring the policy to the region. Given
the centrality of the question of scale to formulating a coherent land
tenure policy, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the experiences in
Brazil and Thailand in an attempt to glean insight relevant to the
Guinea Savannah.
Section V finally takes up the evaluation of land tenure in
Ghana. This case study is structured according to a loose chronology
and traces the development of land tenure in Ghana from the precolonial customary practices through the British colonial period to
contemporary attempts to direct land use toward development. In
these contemporary efforts, one can see both customary and colonial
influences.10 Consideration is given to both the abstract theoretical
understanding of land tenure at each stage and the practical
application as well as the bridge between them. All of this is colored
by an understanding of land policy as reflective of the norms and
values of a society—not only how a people see themselves presently
but also what they aspire to be in the future. A brief conclusion sums
up the central arguments of this note and highlights its main points.
As is often the case, there may be more questions raised by this
discussion than answered. The hope is that a careful consideration of
the issues will lead to a conscientious approach to land tenure reform.
If nothing else, the importance of land tenure policy warrants
9

MORRIS ET AL., AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 259–79.
See JANINE M. UBINK, IN THE LAND OF THE CHIEFS: CUSTOMARY
LAW, LAND CONFLICTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PERI-URBAN GHANA
67–69 (2008); see also CHRISTIAN LUND, LOCAL POLITICS AND THE
DYNAMICS OF PROPERTY IN AFRICA 88–89 (2008); see also Kojo Sebastian
Amanor, Night Harvesters, Forest Hoods and Saboteurs: Struggles over
Land Expropriation in Ghana, in RECLAIMING THE LAND: THE RESURGENCE
OF RURAL MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA 103–106 (Sam
Moyo & Paris Yeros ed., 2005).
10
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thoughtful action on the part of policymakers, stakeholders, and all
others involved.

I. “AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT”
The World Bank’s 2009 CCAA report provides a striking
recognition of Africa’s potential for economic development. The
report was the result of a collaborative effort between the World
Bank; the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO); the governments of Italy, Canada, and the United Kingdom;
and numerous other development institutions. It connects economic
development to agricultural development and recognizes great
potential for the latter in the Guinea Savannah.11 The CCAA report
draws on field surveys of three representative countries within the
region: Mozambique, Nigeria, and Zambia.
The CCAA report hopes to provide ideas for how countries
within the Guinea Savannah might replicate the substantial
agricultural development gains made in Brazil and Thailand during
previous decades.12 The report proposes that countries in the Guinea
Savannah establish competitiveness in low-value commodities such
as cassava, cotton, maize, rice, soybeans, and sugar by exploiting
preferential access in local and regional markets.13 This access is the
result of both formal incentive programs and the practicalities of
global logistics.14 The authors of the CCAA report believe that by
cultivating these low-value commodities and competing in regional
markets, local producers will establish a foundation upon which they
can later expand to higher-value commodities and a more global
market.15
But this begs the question: Why the Guinea Savannah?
Certainly this approach to agricultural development is not unique to
Africa and has already been applied in Brazil and Thailand as well as
elsewhere around the world. Furthermore, the fertility of the Guinea
Savannah is neither a recent development nor a particularly unique

11
12
13
14
15

MORRIS ET AL., AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT, supra note 1, ¶ 354.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶¶ 116–118.
Id. ¶¶ 123–125.
See id. ¶¶ 83–90.
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characteristic, so what makes the region ripe for agricultural
development?
The CCAA report points to five factors that distinguish the
Guinea Savannah: (1) steady economic growth suggests good
prospects for demand in domestic markets; (2) recognition on the
part of governments of the importance of agricultural development
and their willingness to shape policy toward that end; (3) the
strengthening of business interests in many African countries often
associated with infrastructure development; (4) increased interest on
the part of both domestic and foreign investors; and (5) the
availability of technologies that improve crop yields and were not as
widely available during the boom years in Brazil and Thailand.16
Combined, these five factors constitute a perfect storm of potential
for agricultural development:
(1) Farmers have a market that demands their
product.17
(2) Farmers are incentivized to produce by
government programs.18
(3) Farmers have improved access to markets as a
result of improved roads, communication, and
electricity, and rural populations have been
empowered to take a more active role in
development.19
(4) Farmers have the ability to obtain capital from
both foreign and domestic investors, which they
can then use to improve their abilities.20
(5) Farmers can take advantage of available
technology to improve crop yield and quality.21
These are, of course, broad generalizations, and agricultural
development in the Guinea Savannah is not without its hindrances as
well. Among these are the following facts: (1) international
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id. ¶¶ 354–60.
Id. ¶ 356.
Id. ¶ 357.
Id. ¶ 358.
Id. ¶ 359.
Id. ¶ 360.
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competition is significantly more substantial than it was when Brazil
and Thailand underwent their booms; (2) Africa has other priorities it
needs to address separately from agricultural production, including
HIV/AIDS and climate change, which not only distract from the
attention required of agricultural production (and not without reason)
but also have a direct impact on it; (3) that although policy makers
have been vocal in their commitment to agricultural development,
their actions have not always manifested those commitments; (4) the
lack of follow-through is also present in donor organizations and has
suffered particular stress during the recent economic downturn; and
(5) the heterogeneity of the region and the potential for political
instability or bureaucratic congestion could raise transaction costs
and hinder economic activity.22
It is not necessary here to go into much more detail concerning
the opportunities and obstacles noted in the CCAA report – the
Guinea Savannah possesses the level of potential that the sobriquet of
“Africa’s Sleeping Giant” suggests. The CCAA report presents a
number of policy recommendations and interventions that the authors
believe will assist the nations of the Guinea Savannah in capitalizing
on this potential. These recommendations include increasing private
and public investment, implementing public sector reform to promote
good governance and stability, promoting awareness of potential
social and environmental impacts in order to mitigate their effects,
institutional reforms, and others.23 But of the recommendations, the
authors seem to suggest that land policy reform is of particular
importance.24 Consequently it is this initiative that is the focus of
this paper; undoubtedly, the other initiatives have a significant role to
play as well but ultimately clarity first requires focusing one’s
attention.

II. THE LAND GRAB
The urgency of examining land tenure systems in Africa is made
apparent by a 2009 report funded by the FAO, the International
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), and the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The
authors of the report examined land acquisitions during the five years
22
23
24

Id. ¶¶ 362–69.
Id. ¶¶ 370–71.
Id. ¶ 374.
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prior in five African countries including Ghana. All of these
countries have territory within the Guinea Savannah, and have
experienced activity described in the report as a “land grab.”25
The report illustrates several interesting features of the current
land grab:26 (1) there has been a substantial increase in the total area
of land being transferred over the past five years, with nearly 2.5
million hectares of land transferred during that time; (2) there has
been increased investment in land both in terms of number of
projects and area of land dedicated to those projects; (3) large-scale
fees make up a minority of claims to arable land often cultivated by
small-fee holders, but there is growing demand for those areas; (4)
there is some indication of a trend towards an increase in the size of
individual acquisitions, with land allocations measured in the
hundreds of thousands;27 (5) a large percentage of land deals involve
acquisition by private sector interests, though frequently with
substantial support from the government; and (6) a substantial
amount of the investment being made is derived from foreign
sources.28
Given the existence of a land grab, the apparent question is why.
What are the motivations driving this land grab? There are of course
myriad factors involved but three seem to dominate:29 climate
change, shifting global dietary patterns, and financial gain.30 First,
the environmental concerns involved with climate change have
provided an impetus for substantial investment in the research and
25

COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 99–101.
Of course, records of land deals in developing countries are not
always available or reliable so the observations made by the report should be
treated with caution. They serve as indicators of general trends without the
sort of statistical precision one might expect in other circumstances.
27
This particular trend tends to be more localized in countries like
Madagascar, Ethiopia, and Mali and is less pervasive throughout the
continent.
28
COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 99.
29
Based on the author’s personal observation during three and a half
years in the Sahel, there seems to be a strong argument that the demand for
timber constitutes a fourth factor. Although this influence has been around
for some time, global population spikes have led to increased demand for
both domestic use as well as export. Considering the rapid desertification
that is occurring in the Sahel and the gradual intrusion of the Sahara south,
there is good reason for residents of the Guinea Savannah to be concerned.
30
COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 52–59.
26
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development of alternative energy sources.31 Among the most
promising of these are biofuels made from agricultural products
which previously had been used almost exclusively for food
consumption.32 Consequently, a sharp increase in the demand for
agricultural products has brought with it an increased demand for
arable land. Additionally, concerns about climate change have led to
an increased interest in maximizing the carbon offsetting value of
land, a use that is not necessarily aligned with maximizing food or
fuel production.33
Second, the explosion of the global population has heightened
the demand for food production.34 Although there is no need for
concern that a Neo-Malthusian catastrophe is around the corner,
rapid increases in population and consumption will necessarily put
stress on production rates that are increasing at a much steadier rate.
Portions of the Guinea Savannah already experience challenges in
meeting the nutritional needs of the population without having to
compete with wealthier consumers. The challenge is further
exacerbated by the fact that substantial portions of the world’s
population are in the process of shifting from a predominantly
vegetarian diet to a more Western-style diet, heavily supplemented
with animal protein.35 Animal protein is not an efficient use of
agricultural inputs because the amount of land needed to sustain
livestock is disproportionate to the amount of sustenance it can
provide.36 This shift in dietary patterns has magnified the effect of
the population explosion and substantially increased the demand for
arable land.37
Third, due to the increased demand for arable land brought about
by concerns of climate change and food production, the world

31

Id. at 54–56.
Id.
33
Id. at 58.
34
Id. at 53.
35
U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOD CRISIS: THE
ENVIRONMENT’S ROLE IN AVERTING THE FOOD CRISES 17 (Christian Nelleman
et al. eds., 2009), available at http://www.grida.no/files/publications
/FoodCrisis_lores.pdf; see also CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, A
CALL FOR A STRATEGIC U.S. APPROACH TO THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS 4–5
(2008).
36
See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 35, at 17.
37
COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 54.
32
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experienced a sharp increase in the monetary value of such land.38
Given that the demand for arable land is likely to continue to rise,
many now consider land acquisition to be a solid financial
investment. The global food shortage of 2007 and 2008 saw the
price of many staple food products skyrocket throughout the world
and made it abundantly clear that increased demand and generous
rates of return on land investment are reliable expectations.39
There are also disincentives to land acquisition as a form of
investment, not least of which is the danger inherent in insecure
tenure. If a potential investor is not able to determine who owns a
particular parcel of land, he will be unable to acquire it except via
adverse possession or government intervention. If a potential
investor is not assured of the parcel’s ownership, he will risk
answering a competing claim at a later point and losing any
investments. And these concerns are heightened when an investor
attempts to assemble a large-scale fee out of several adjoining fees—
one problematic title can have repercussions throughout the area.
These concerns not only disincentivize land acquisition but also lead
to a lower value for the transfer.
Yet insecure land tenure and other disincentives, including
political instability and corruption, are likely to only hinder land
acquisition. At some point the potential benefits of investment in
arable land will outweigh the risks, and the land grab report seems to
indicate that this point is fast approaching.40 Several consequences
are likely to result: First, landowners who do not currently have
secure tenure are vulnerable to being dispossessed of their land.41
38

Id. at 56–58.
Derek Heady & Shenggen Fan, International Food Policy Research
Institute, Anatomy of a Crisis: The Causes and Consequences of Surging
Food Prices, IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPER 00831, at 15–16 (2008), available at
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/pubs/pubs/dp/ifpridp00831.pdf. In the
United States, the price of agricultural land has seen double-digit annual
growth since 2005, demonstrating the rapid growth in demand for arable
land. Cynthia Nickerson et al., Trends in U.S. Farmland Values and
Ownership, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. INFO. BULL., Feb. 2012, at 34,
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/377487/eib92_2_.pdf.
40
See COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 99–102.
41
George C. Schoneveld et al., Center for International Forestry
Research, Towards Sustainable Biofuel Development: Assessing the Local
Impacts of Large-Scale Foreign Land Acquisitions in Ghana § 4.2
(forthcoming
2010),
available
at
39
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Second, those who do possess secure tenure are unlikely to receive
full value compensation for alienation of their titles.42 And third,
disputes over titles are likely to lead to increased conflicts in courts
and elsewhere.43
Among the recommendations proffered by the land grab report,
an emphasis on land tenure reform is again notable. The authors
indicate a need to address the usefulness of various land tenure
policies.44 The most prominent approaches to land tenure either
involve the establishment of an individual titling system or the
recognition of customary communitarian land rights.45 These two
systems are explicated and examined in the following section.

III. COMPETING PARADIGMS
The majority of the literature on land tenure reform tends to
focus on two core approaches. The first involves the establishment
of individual titles to parcels of land that are made fully alienable.46
The approach draws heavily from a Western understanding of land
tenure and claims to be forward looking in so far as it is intended to
promote economic development.47 The second approach focuses on
communal land use and draws primarily from traditional approaches
to land tenure common in Africa.48 In this regard a communal tenure
approach could be described as backward looking in so far as it is
reflective of the history and culture of a society rather than
aspirational.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARD/Resources/3366811236436879081/5893311-1271205116054/schoneveld.pdf.
42
Id.
43
See Amanor, supra note 10, at 110–15.
44
See COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 15.
45
See Franklin Obeng-Odoom, Land Reforms in Africa: Theory,
Practice, and Outcome, 36 HABITAT INT’L 161, 162–63 (2012), available at
http://procasur.org/extractive-industries/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Landreform-in-Africa-Theory-pratice-outcomes_Obeng-Odoom.pdf.
46
Id. at 162.
47
KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 139–40 (2006); Obeng-Odoom, supra note
45, at 162.
48
Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163.
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A. INDIVIDUAL TITLING APPROACH
The individual titling approach draws on the premise that
economic development is based on access to credit. In his book The
Mystery of Capital, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto attempts
to connect the recognition and protection of property rights with
poverty reduction through economic advancement.49 This is a
neoliberal approach that derives the brunt of its force from the notion
that property is more secure when only one person has a valid legal
claim to it.50
As de Soto sees it, substantial resources are used to protect land
when tenure is not secure.51 The allocation of resources to this end is
understandable given the importance of land for subsistence.
Consequently, landowners will leave able-bodied individuals at home
to protect property limiting their ability to engage in economic
activity.52
Similarly, farmers expend significant resources to
demarcate boundaries and fence plots in order to prevent
encroachment by neighbors. For instance, in Ghana private security
guards have become ubiquitous because of the need for someone to
watch over property during the owner’s absence.53 The protection of
current possessions is prioritized over the pursuit of new avenues for
wealth production. This is an inefficient use of resources. An
individual titling approach argues that this inefficiency can be
remedied by the recognition and enforcement of individual
ownership.54 If an individual has formal title that he realistically
expects the government will enforce, then he can redirect resources
towards wealth production.55
Furthermore, individual land titling provides an incentive for
investment in the land leading to enhanced productivity.56 If tenure
is not secure, farmers are less likely to invest in their land because it
will increase loss if property is seized. Investment might even
increase the likelihood of seizure because it makes the land more
attractive. And if the land is intended for communal use, the farmer
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

See generally DE SOTO, supra note 8.
Id. at 39–67; DAM, supra note 47, at 134–141.
See DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 61–62.
DAM, supra note 47, at 138.
Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 164.
DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 61–62.
DAM, supra note 47, at 135.
DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 49–51.
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might fear that any new investments will be reaped by someone
else.57
By establishing an individual titling system, states can also
create new access to capital to be used for investment.58 With secure
title a poor farmer can obtain credit by using land as collateral.59
Additionally, individually titled land can be fully and easily
transferred. This means a poor farmer can have access to money in
times of need by liquidating all or part of his property.60 And
because the title of the land is both secure and transferable, its value
will increase regardless of how it is used.61
Despite the arguments of de Soto and other neoliberal
economists, this approach is foreign to many parts of the developing
world, including most of Africa.62 Applying such a foreign system
without alteration is likely to present substantial challenges.63 Since
transition to individual land tenure is generally shepherded by the
political and social elite, the process usually solidifies their
positions.64 Vulnerable groups65 have less opportunity to assert their
claim to property and consequently are less likely to have it formally
recognized.66 Capital seems to be more myth than mystery for many
non-elites. Customary systems can be far from egalitarian,67 but they
generally provide protection for vulnerable populations through
mechanisms such as kinship networks.68
Transition to an individual land tenure system can be daunting.
Determining ownership, demarcating parcels, and establishing a
reliable registration system require enormous effort and expense. In
addition, transition can bring to the surface latent disputes that need
57

Id. at 62.
Id.
59
Id. at 56–58.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 167–68.
63
Id.; see also Amanor, supra note 10, at 116–17.
64
Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 167.
65
For example, women, rural and urban poor, ethnic minorities, etc.
66
Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 167; George A. Sarpong,
Improving Tenure Security for the Rural Poor: Ghana – Country Case Study
17 (FAO, LEP Working Paper No. 2, 2006), available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/k0783e/k0783e00.pdf.
67
Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 167.
68
Id. at 163.
58
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to be litigated or otherwise resolved, placing a further drain on
resources.69
B. COMMUNAL LAND TENURE
Traditional land use in much of Africa70 conceptualizes land as
property of the whole community.71 Members of the community are
permitted to use the land, and the community has a mechanism to
safeguard against exploitation; likewise, communal land tenures
possess mechanisms that steward the land for the benefit of all.72
It is important, however, to distinguish communal land use from
open access.73 Hardin warned against the danger of open access
leading to a “tragedy of the commons.”74 With open access there is
no ownership of the land so all are able to exploit its resources. With
little incentive to preserve the land for future use, overexploitation
seems inevitable.75 But communal land is different in that the
69

See Amanor, supra note 10, at 106–17.
It is dangerous to be too precise at this point as the specific details of
communal land arrangements can vary greatly. The structure of traditional
Ghanaian land use is taken up later.
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Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163; Lennox Kwame Agbosu, Land
Law in Ghana: Contradiction between Anglo-American and Customary
Conceptions of Tenure and Practices 11 (Land Tenure Ctr., Working Paper
No. 33, 2000) [hereinafter Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana] available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/12796/1/ltcwp33.pdf.
72
Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163.
73
The distinction has been explained in great detail in the writings of
Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(James E. Alt & Douglass C. North, eds., 1990) [hereinafter OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS] (explaining how mechanisms can emerge in the
use of shared resources that avoid overexploitation associated with open
access); ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL
RESOURCES (1994) (further developing the distinction between common pool
resources and open access so as to minimize the threat of overexploitation).
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See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243–45 (1968) [hereinafter Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons].
In fairness, Hardin later narrowed the scope to what he would call the
“tragedy of the unmanaged commons.” Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
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(emphasis added).
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See generally Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 74.
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community owns it. Members of the community have the right to
access the land and exclude outsiders.76 The community has a vested
interest in preventing overexploitation and ensuring future fertility.77
Communities develop systems to allocate land use within the
community such as rotating plots or maintaining ancestral
homesteads.78 Communities also establish criteria for non-member
access when it is in the community’s interest.79 Decisions about
admissions of non-members or allocations within the community are
based on internal conflict-resolution systems such as councils of
elders or chieftainships.80
Communal land tenure has the notable advantage of being
organic. Because it is the result of social interactions over
generations, it developed in a way that reflects the norms and values
of the community.81 In much of Africa, kinship and social
relationships are of paramount importance, and communal land
tenure both reflects and reinforces these values.82 Communal land
tenure resonates with the community by reflecting its social norms
and thereby legitimizes land ownership. These cultures view a
community's claim to land as more legitimate, and that legitimacy
enhances the tenure’s security.
Additionally, the organic nature of these systems often includes
built-in safety nets to protect against catastrophic events:83 A widow
might be taken in by her husband’s family, an orphan might be
adopted by extended family members, or an HIV positive individual
might be cared for by the community as a whole. This is not to
suggest that acts of generosity do not occur within individual tenure
systems, but in such societies, they tend to be just that—acts of
generosity. In communal land systems, the significance of kinship
and social relationships underlying communal tenure also provides
mechanisms that do not require altruism.
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But for each advantage of communal tenure systems, there is a
readily available counterpoint. Even if communal titles have greater
legitimacy and security, their communal ownership also makes them
difficult to transfer. Secure tenure might limit the wasting of
resources on claim protection and create an incentive to invest in
future productivity, but without transferability it does not provide the
access to credit required for investment.84 If land cannot be
transferred it cannot be used as collateral, and inalienability further
reduces its value.85
Similarly, although communal land tenure provides social safety
nets these societies are often far from egalitarian.86 Although the
community provides for widows, orphans, and HIV positive
individuals in the event of catastrophe, these individuals are rarely
given much autonomy.87 Maintaining traditional systems is unlikely
to shift power dynamics; meaning vulnerable populations are apt to
retain their position. But, as discussed above, individual land tenure
is no more likely to shift the positions of elite and vulnerable
populations; even if individual tenure promotes autonomy in theory,
it rarely does so in application.88 Moreover, individual tenure
systems do risk undermining social networks that protect vulnerable
populations.89

IV. QUESTION OF SCALE
There is an additional consideration to examine before
evaluating land tenure policies in Ghana—What scale of agricultural
production is most conducive to economic development?
Specifically, Is it better to have large or small farms?
The answer to this question depends on numerous factors, both
internal and external.90 The requirements of specific crops, regional
fertility level, and availability of skilled workers impact a country’s
agricultural potential.91 On a larger scale, the demands of global
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

See DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 56–58.
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Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163.
See Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 10–11.
See Sarpong, supra note 66, at 17.
See Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163.
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capital, logistical issues of transporting goods to market, and the
requirement that the origin of certain products be traceable will affect
agricultural development.92 The scale of farms must align with these
factors in order to maximize economic development.93 For example,
if a crop requires intensive labor and the local population is capable
of managing it, then small-scale farming would be ideal. On the
other hand, if there is limited available transportation for delivering
goods to market, then a larger farm might benefit from an economy
of scale that would allow it to transport goods in a more costeffective way.94 Similarly, if the end user needs to know the precise
origin of the goods,95 then large-scale farms will be more capable of
tracking product movement.96 The size of farms is not the only
contributing factor; large farms hire workers when mechanization is
impossible,97 small farms form cooperatives to capitalize on
economies of scale,98 and technology makes traceability
requirements easier to satisfy. However, farm size remains one of
the most significant influences on a country’s potential for
agricultural development.
The predominant determinant of farm size, and one on which a
government has substantial influence, is the size of plots. If large
fees are possible then large farms become possible. Policymakers
impact the size of fees through the implementation of land tenure and
regulatory systems—some encourage the consolidation of parcels
into large fees while others incentivize retaining smaller fees or
dividing larger ones.99 To take the two approaches discussed above
as examples, the ease of transferability associated with individual
titling systems allows one to compile a number of adjacent parcels
and establish a large farm. Community-based tenure systems, on the
other hand, maximize output by dividing land into smaller parcels
92

Id. ¶¶ 12–20.
See id.
94
See id. ¶ 19 (noting that “economies of scale are found in the
plantation crops and among highly perishable commodities that must be
processed and/or shipped quickly”).
95
For example, to satisfy regulatory requirements intended to prevent
the intrusion of genetically modified crops into food stores or to enable the
identification of public health threats.
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overseen by small farmers.100 Policymakers should consider the
correlation between land tenure systems and farm size when shaping
the future of their countries. Two examples of rapid agricultural
development presented in the CCAA report demonstrate the potential
for both large- and small-scale approaches.101 The Cerrado region of
Brazil followed a path marked by large-scale farms, and Northeast
Thailand established agricultural prosperity with small-scale
farms.102 Either approach can be effective in the appropriate
circumstances. Since scale is a significant factor in agricultural
development, tailoring farm size to the specific circumstances can
impact the rate of that development.
In Brazil, the availability of credit and marketing services along
with the government’s promotion of mechanization resulted in the
dominance of large farms.103 In Thailand, an emphasis on land titling
for small farmers meant that small-scale farms fueled the agricultural
development.104 While both countries saw a marked increase in
income levels and decrease in food costs, in Thailand, the small-scale
approach had a greater impact on overall poverty levels.105 After a
detailed discussion of the merits and challenges of large- and smallscale farming, the CCAA report concludes that, with a few
exceptions, the Guinea Savannah does not require a large-scale
approach.106 Given the nature of the crops, the focus on regional
markets, and the fertility of the land, the region is not likely to
disproportionately benefit from large-scale farming.107 In light of the
poverty reduction achieved through a small-scale approach in
Thailand, the CCAA report suggests that policymakers apply the
Thai approach to the Guinea Savannah.108 By limiting the ability to
transfer or concentrate property as well as creating regulatory

100

Thomas Sikor & Daniel Müller, The Limits of State-Led Land
Reform: An Introduction, 37 WORLD DEV. 1307, 1310–11 (2009).
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incentives for small farms, policymakers can emulate the success of
Thailand.109

V. GHANA: A CASE STUDY
We turn now to an examination of the situation in Ghana. What
is the current state of its land tenure system? How is that approach
likely to shape the country’s agricultural development in the coming
years? Can policymakers implement systems that will exploit the
agricultural potential of the Guinea Savannah?
A. PRE-COLONIAL LAND TENURE
The customary land tenure system in Ghana fell within the
communal paradigm.110 With slight variation among ethnic groups,
the predominant model was based on kinship relationships.111 The
intertwining of social and familial relationships with land tenure
permitted effective cultivation, while avoiding overexploitation.112
Pre-colonial Ghanaian societies achieved this without the more
formalized land interests seen in Western cultures.113
In most ethnic groups, access to communal land depended on
membership in the group, with outsiders excluded by default.114
Furthermore, land access was not connected to social status and each
member had equal right to use the land.115 In theory at least, access
109
While it is true that agricultural development is the result of
numerous influences in addition to a country’s land tenure system, it is
equally true that the approach to land tenure can have consequences in areas
distinct from agriculture. Land tenure systems can impact vulnerable
populations including women, ethnic minorities, and people living with
HIV/AIDS. Similarly, land tenure policies can affect the environment
through agriculture. In an interrelated world, policymakers cannot focus
exclusively on agricultural development. Decisions aimed at development
must remain cognizant of the impact on other areas.
110
UBINK, supra note 10, at 42–43; Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra
note 71, at 11.
111
Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 10–11; see also
UBINK, supra note 10, at 42–43.
112
Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 11.
113
Id.
114
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115
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to land was tied exclusively to community membership.116 It is
tempting to analogize this approach to the Western concept of joint
tenancy, where each individual owns the property as a whole and has
the right to enjoy the whole, but the administration of land use in precolonial Ghana resulted in quite a different system. However, one
may perhaps more usefully conceptualize this framework as
something akin to a land trust intended to be used for the benefit of
the community as a whole, including future generations.
But in order to ensure that land use aligns with community
interests, an administrative system is required; decisions must be
made about who will cultivate which parcel, when to permit outsider
access, and whether alienation serves the interest of the community.
Land administration demonstrates distinct differences among ethnic
groups in Ghana.117 In Ashanti and Akan communities, land
administration was grafted onto political authority.118 The same
person or group of people making political decisions (frequently a
chief or council of elders) also made decisions about land use.119 In
contrast, among the Ewe and other non-Akan communities, political
authority was separate from land administration and family heads
were the decision makers.120 In other groups, religious leaders made
decisions about land use.121 Yet, in all cases, whomever made
decisions was expected to promote the benefit of the community as a
whole.122
Safeguarding mechanisms assured decisions were made
accordingly. The decision to permit use by outsiders or sell land, for
example, would require approval by a council of elders.123 These
safeguards had varying degrees of formality and were enforced by
social and kinship networks. People understood that the land
belonged to the community or the community’s ancestors and
expected their leaders to act accordingly. The concept of stool lands
found among the Ga-Mashie and other ethnic groups exemplifies this
116
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Id. In some cases these religious leaders also exercised political
theory but just as often did not.
122
LUND, supra note 10, at 48–49; UBINK, supra note 10, at 42.
123
See, e.g., UBINK, supra note 10, at 43–44.
117

2012]

SECURING LAND TENURE & AGRICULTURAL
151
DEVELOPMENT IN THE GUINEA SAVANNAH: A
GHANAIAN CASE STUDY
conceptualization of land tenure.124 In these communities, a chief or
political leader occupies a wooden.125 Similar to the idea of a throne
in a monarchy or the Chair of St. Peter in Roman Catholic tradition,
an individual might occupy the stool but the authority exercised is
vested within the position and associated with the stool itself.126 The
stool, as explained by Agbosu, “is believed to embody the spirits of
the ancestors and the souls of the body politic subject to the
jurisdictional authority of the person occupying it.”127 Consequently,
allodial title belongs to the community—past, present, and future—
and the chief is responsible for administering it accordingly. Again,
the analogy to a land trust seems useful, if not exact.
The efficacy of the traditional approach to land tenure in Ghana
is evidenced by the complex society that existed prior to
colonization. When Westerners arrived on the coast of what would
become Ghana, they found an intricate system of groups engaged in
trade and interaction throughout West and North Africa.128 These
groups managed to cultivate both the agricultural potential and
mineral resources of the region.129 The literature indicates that this
remains the de facto approach to land tenure in a large part of Ghana,
even if formal de jure property laws suggest a more Western
approach.130 This inconsistency of de facto and de jure tenure
constitutes one component of the challenge facing policymakers.
Yet, it should not be assumed that the circumstances of pre-colonial
West Africa are identical with present-day Ghana or that an approach
that has been useful in the past will be equally efficacious in the
modern era of globalization. As Ubink points out, a romanticized
view of traditional customary land use is challenged by the
realization that population growth, increased land value, and
reduction in new frontiers has led to the commodification of land.131
124
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This commodification threatens the administration of customary land
and results in a distinct lack of tenure security.132
B. THE BRITISH INFLUENCE
Interaction with Western colonial powers altered land tenure in
West Africa, and the system in Ghana was inevitably shaped by
British influence.133 Even before the Gold Coast was officially
declared a British protectorate in 1874, administrative authorities
applied English statutory law to local land tenure issues.134 Yet, fully
alienable property established by formal title was a foreign notion to
indigenous populations, and its application led to substantial
confusion during the British colonial period.
Traditional land use was enforced via kinship networks, and
elaborate ceremonies memorialized significant land transfers. These
ceremonies assured recipients that the transfer would not be forgotten
and their rights challenged.135 Yet the concept of property ownership
separate from possessory interest was completely foreign. That
ownership could be vested in something as innocuous as a piece of
paper seemed unfathomable. Consequently, when illiterate chiefs
and community leaders transferred title under the colonial system it
is doubtful they comprehended the ramifications of the action.136 At
best, traditional communities viewed the deed as a memorialization
of an agreement to permit use rather than an instrument of
divestment.137
Merchants and other elites were familiar with English property
law and often mediated conveyances between local communities and
Western interests.138 However, these conveyances were framed by
European property law and artificially interjected the concept of
RESPONSES AND TENURE SECURITY IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA 133
(Janine M. Ubink et al. eds., 2009).
132
See Amanor, supra note 10, at 131.
133
See Victor Essien, Sources of Law in Ghana, 24 J. BLACK STUDIES
246 (1994) (discussing the interplay between colonial and customary
influences in contemporary Ghanaian law, both property and otherwise).
134
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135
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individual ownership into the land tenure system.139 Unsurprisingly,
myriad conflicts arose as the problems of a dual tenure system
emerged without an adequate means of mediation.140 One person
would claim the right to use a parcel of land based on the purchase of
paper title, while another person claimed the same land as member of
the community that traditionally cultivated it.141 Conflicts became so
widespread that a West African Land Committee was established in
1912.142 Although the Committee’s final report was never officially
published, it determined that some 36,000 square miles of land had
been transferred from customary ownership within the colony.143
The colonial administration claimed authority over an area that
included less than 25,000 square miles.144 The discrepancy was
almost certainly due to duplicate claims and multiple conveyances.
Mass confusion resulted in countless disputes that were resolved
within a legal framework that disadvantaged indigenous
communities.145
Some have argued that the initial transfers of land from
communal ownership were not valid under English property law.146
They argue that because the ownership of land was vested in the
community as the whole, chiefs did not have the authority to divest
the community of land but merely to oversee its administration.147
Claims of authority were irrelevant because the sale of land under
color of title is still invalid.148 But this would mean that stool lands
could never be transferred short of a unanimous decision by the
community as a whole, and even then the interest of future
generations would be ignored. Yet, making communal land entirely
non-transferable does not comport with traditional notions either.
Some representative of the community must have the authority to
139
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alienate it.149 For all practical purposes, the argument is moot; no
serious policymaker would suggest voiding all land transfers away
from communal ownership, it is simply not realistic. Instead the
modern state of Ghana must face the hodgepodge legacy of its
colonial past and develop a coherent strategy for minimizing and
resolving disputes. Ghana’s attempts, both successful and otherwise,
are taken up in the next section.
C. THE POST-INDEPENDENCE MILIEU
Following independence in 1957, the Gold Coast, now Ghana,
faced the challenges of a nation emerging from colonial rule. Selfrule was far from easy, and sorting out an effective and efficient land
tenure system was essential to establishing a solid foundation for
stability and future growth.
In 1962, the Land Registry Act required all private transfers to
be in writing and registered.150
A Lands Commission was
established by the 1969 Constitution and tasked with overseeing the
registration of titles and administration of public lands.151 A few
years later the Ghanaian legislature extended the registration
requirement to include conveyances of communal land.152 Attempts
to enforce the new requirement included increased power for the
Lands Commission, but ultimately fell flat.153 The statute was later
repealed, but the attempt to regulate land transfers did not stop, and
in 1980 the Lands Commission began requiring property owners to
obtain its consent prior to any alienation.154 Six years later, persistent
in its attempts to regulate land use, the Lands Commission began
requiring the registration of all title of ownership, not simply
transference deeds.155 The Lands Commission then aggressively
campaigned to register all titles with unimpressive results; from the
149
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program’s implementation in 1986 until 2006 only 42,000
applications for title were filed and less than 30% of those were
successfully registered.156
The Ghanaian government viewed colonial administrative
mechanisms as its only tool for sorting out its land tenure issues but
applied this tool disingenuously. As a result, individual titling
became further entrenched in the Ghanaian system.157 It had become
apparent, however, that a complete shift to this approach was not
practical. Perhaps it was for this reason that the 1992 Ghanaian
Constitution formally recognized customary communal land tenure
within areas identified as “stool lands.”158
Additionally, an
Administer of Stool Lands was created to ensure rents were paid to
the communities for the use of stool lands. This recognition marked
a shift away from an approach exclusively focused on individual
titling. Unfortunately, this recognition would again be muted as
emphasis returned to title registration over the coming decade.159
In 1999, the Ghanaian government admitted the shortcomings of
its land tenure system and committed itself to reform that would
solidify tenure security.160 Three years later, details of the Ghanaian
plan focused again on title registration; 161 the Ghanaian government
had doubled down. The government tasked the Land Administration
Project (LAP) with comprehensive reform of the country’s land
tenure system and oversight of the numerous agencies involved.162
Notably, this plan extended title registration (as opposed to deed
registration) to the whole country rather than merely the initial
156
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handful of districts to which it had previously applied.163 This
resulted in a rush to register titles, and Ghanaians inundated the Land
Register with claims that had to be validated to prevent fraud.164
In the past few years, the government has attempted to
streamline transitional oversight by creating a new Lands
Commission that has assumed responsibility for title registration,
land surveying, valuation, and administration.165 Numerous nongovernmental organizations as well as bilateral and multilateral
government collaborations are providing the resources required for
such a comprehensive initiative.166 With boots on the ground and
financial backing, policymakers are hoping that the initiative will
achieve greater success than that realized in the 1980s.
For the time being, the Ghanaian government intends to pursue a
land tenure system modeled on the de Soto approach. Although
communities are permitted to register land within Ghana’s system,
there are significant barriers in place.167 The result is a de facto shift
towards individual titles.168 But the long-term effects of this shift are
far from clear.
Many criticize these policies as further
disadvantaging vulnerable populations or creating dangerous
environmental impacts.169
These critiques are worthy of
163
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consideration and warrant policy alterations in their own right, but
the present question is whether these policies lead to agricultural
development and poverty reduction. Certainly, the consensus among
most global policymakers is that individual land titling will lead to
these outcomes; however, not everyone is so confident.170
D. LOOKING FORWARD
The Ghanaian government seems committed to the de Soto
approach. The previous failure of this approach has been explained
as the result of poor implementation—previous efforts lacked the
resources necessary for proper implementation. The current strategy
places renewed emphasis on a comprehensive effort to register
ownership throughout the country.171 Partner institutions that hope to
spur future development have provided the substantial resources
required for this undertaking. 172 The Ghanaian government views
this enormous project as a prerequisite for development, and,
consequently, has made it a priority.173
However, it is unclear how the legacy of communal land tenure
will affect this undertaking. Although the Ghanaian Constitution
officially recognizes communal land,174 such land is given little
thought otherwise. Based on Ghana’s experience during the colonial
period, there is little reason to believe that a dual tenure system will
not persist—that community land will remain the de facto tenure
system while individual titling will serve a largely de jure function.
The resulting insecurity will not create a scenario in which the
country can capitalize on its agricultural opportunity. International
developers will be less interested, and those who do invest will refuse
to pay full value for insecure title. Likewise, local interests will be
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undermined and vulnerable groups ignored during the ensuing land
grab. The whole process will likely be characterized by conflict. In
the end, Ghana will have a system of large-scale agriculture. GDP
will almost certainly increase but do very little to alleviate poverty.
The elite will enjoy the benefits of agricultural development while
basic human rights are put in jeopardy.
While Ghana’s attempt to replace community tenure suggests a
negative outcome, returning to the pre-colonial communal system
seems equally naive. A hybrid system appears inevitable at this
point.175 This does not mean, however, that a hybrid system must
take the hodgepodge form of the colonial era. A review of that
period indicates that the disorder was due to failure to systematically
integrate the two approaches.176 By making a strong push towards
nationwide individual titling, the Ghanaian government aims to
replace one approach with another and in so doing ignores the
lessons of its past. Not only will complete replacement fail, it is
likely to hamper any potential for development. On the other hand, a
conscientious integration of the two approaches offers the
opportunity to recognize the normative values of the communal
approach while preparing to enter the global market.177
Ghana can put the same effort toward securing communal land
that it is currently doing for individual land. If title is established for
communities, then that land will be available for agricultural
development. The security of the title will increase the value of the
land and provide the communities with access to credit in order to
develop it further. With secure tenure as the crux of most
development models (including de Soto’s), the resulting limitations
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on transferability are less significant. Of course, the land is still
transferable even if traditional administration makes it more difficult.
But given the CCAA’s preference for small-scale agriculture within
the Guinea Savannah, the need to assemble large tracts of land is not
present—meaning that transferability is even less of a concern. A
hybrid system that institutionalizes both communal and individual
title accompanied by a strong administrative system is likely to be
Ghana’s best hope for taking advantage of its position as part of
“Africa’s Sleeping Giant.”

CONCLUSION
The example of Ghana demonstrates the complex situation of
land tenure throughout the Guinea Savannah. Nearly all countries
within the region have experienced the imposition of Western
conceptualizations of property law through colonial influences. Yet,
rarely have individual tenure systems completely usurped the place
of customary law. Consequently, most of the Guinea Savannah faces
varying amalgamations of both individual and communal land. Mass
confusion and conflict frequently result, creating a quagmire for
agricultural development. If these countries wish to capitalize on
their potential, then policymakers must first manage to unravel the
Gordian knot of their disorderly land tenure systems. Without doing
so, they will have difficulty providing the security necessary to
replicate the prosperity of Brazil or Thailand.
Western-styled individual tenure systems do not resonate with
the normative values of the region and consequently fail to provide
the level of capital de Soto suggests. Conversely, traditional
communal tenure systems ignore the impact of two centuries of
colonial influence. Policymakers must, as a practical matter, pursue
a hybrid model that incorporates elements of both the individual and
communal approaches. By structuring the current hodgepodge into
an organized system, policymakers can minimize conflicts.
Additionally, the stabilization of tenure systems will increase land
value and strengthen the countries’ potential for agricultural
development in a way that alleviates poverty and establishes a
foundation for human rights.

